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BOOKER'S IRONIES
Ryan W. Scott'
INTRODUCTION
IN January 2005, when the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated
decision in United States v. Booker,' few observers were surprised by the
Court's constitutional decision. By a 5-4 margin, the same Justices who had
found constitutional defects in state determinate sentencing schemes in Apprendi
v. New Jersey2 and Blakely v. Washington3 concluded that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") violated the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial by allowing a judge to find certain aggravating facts that increased an
offender's sentence.4
By a different 5-4 majority, however, the Court selected a surprising
remedy for that constitutional defect. The Court rendered the Guidelines
"effectively advisory," strikinq down statutory provisions that made the
Guidelines binding on judges. That remedy was unexpected: neither the
respondents, nor the government, nor members of Congress,6 nor any other amici
curiae had suggested it.7
Booker rocked the federal criminal justice system, generating furious
speculation about its long-term effects. Critics of the Guidelines hailed the
Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington.
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 446 (2000).
3. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
4. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44 (Stevens, J., majority opinion).
5. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
6. See Brief for Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105), 2004 WL 1950640, at *21-25
[hereinafter Brief for Senators] (discouraging the Court from adopting different rules for fact
finding that adjusts the offense level "down, but not up," but not suggesting a system of advisory
guidelines).
7. Justice Breyer first floated the possibility of advisory guidelines at oral argument, asking
then-Acting Solicitor General Paul Clement "what would be wrong with" altering Section
3553(b)(1) to make the Guidelines advisory in all cases? Transcript of Oral Argument, United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105), 2004 WL 2331491, at *44. The pre-
Booker proposal that came closest to the Court's remedial decision was Albert Alschuler's
suggestion to "reinterpret[]" Section 3553(b)(1) to make the Guidelines "presumptive" instead of
mandatory. Albert W. Alschuler, To Sever or Not to Sever? Why Blakely Requires Action By
Congress, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 1, 16 (2004).
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decision as a surprise death blow to a system they reviled.8 Judges who had
chafed at the Guidelines' mandatory and inflexible rules saw the decision as "a
sort of Emancipation Proclamation."9  The defense bar was "ecstatic."' 0
Supporters of the Guidelines in Congress and the Department of Justice, on the
other hand, issued dire warnings of "wildly divergent" sentencing outcomes" and
a return to "pre-guideline chaos." 2 Several newspaper editorials reacted more
cautiously, suggesting that the Court "may have stumbled into a reasonable
compromise" and urging a wait-and-see approach.1 3 Scholars hoped the decision
and its aftermath would afford an opportunity to fix the federal sentencing
system's flaws.1 4 But for better or worse, many observers saw the decision as
"the end of federal criminal sentencing as we know it."' 5
One immediately apparent feature of the Booker remedy, however, was a
basic irony. According to the Court, the mandatory guidelines were
unconstitutional because they deprived offenders of their Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury.' 6 Yet rendering the Guidelines advisory did not enhance the role
of juries at sentencing. To the contrary, in the advisory system, judicial fact
8. For a collection of reactions, see Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in
Federal Sentencing: An Unexpected Benefit of Booker?, 37 McGEORGE L. REv. 787, 787-88
(2006).
9. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee ... or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations about the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System after Booker, 43 Hous. L.
REV. 279, 280 (2006). See also Hon. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves
Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569, 579 (2005) (describing some judges who cheered Booker as a "free at
last" moment); Carl Huse & Adam Liptak, New Fight over Controlling Punishments Is Widely
Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29 (quoting Judge Jack Weinstein, who described himself as
"elated" and predicted that "most judges will be, too."); Shelley Murphy, Two Boston Jurists Hail
Return ofDiscretion, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2005, at A20.
10. Mark Hamblett, Defense Lawyers Hail Sentencing Decisions, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 13, 2005, at 1.
See also Lorraine Woellert & Mike France, Corporate Cases: Time to Cut a Deal?: A New Ruling
Could Empower Defendants-Until Congress Rewrites Sentencing Rules, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 24,
2005, at 43. But see Margareth Etienne, Into the Briar Patch? Power Shifts Between Prosecution
and Defense After United States v. Booker, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 743 & n.9 (2005) (arguing that
the optimism of the defense bar was unwarranted, and that Booker on the whole benefited
prosecutors).
11. Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Voids Mandatory Sentencing in Federal Courts, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 13, 2005, at C1 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray).
12. Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Supreme Court Decision on Sentencing Guidelines
(Jan 14, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 2769009.
13. See The Court on Sentencing, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2005, at A18. See also Letting Judges
Pass Judgment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A22.
14. See, e.g., David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing Reform after Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163, 178 (2005); Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for
Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV.
217, 231-33 (2005).
15. Etienne, supra note 10, at 743. See also Steven G. Kalar et al., A Booker Advisory: Into
the Breyer Patch, CHAMPION (NAT'L Ass'N CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS), Mar. 2005, at 8 (calling
Booker the "culminat[ion]" of "the sentencing revolution begun ... in Apprendi"); Craig Green,
Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93
GEO. L.J. 395, 395 (2005).
16. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244-45 (2005) (Stevens, J., majority opinion).
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finding and discretion play an even more prominent role in sentencing decisions.
How could a constitutional holding that judges exercised too much discretion
morph into a remedial holding that judges should enjoy even greater discretion? 7
Eleven years later, Booker's ironies have grown even deeper, calling into
question important premises of the Court's remedial opinion. This Article,
drawing on trends in federal sentencing outcomes and a growing body of
empirical research, reevaluates the winners and losers under the advisory
guidelines' regime. In doing so, it highlights two fresh ironies in Booker that
have become apparent only after more than a decade of experience.
First, the class of offenders most harmed by Booker is precisely the class of
offenders whose constitutional rights were being violated under the mandatory
guidelines. Under the advisory guidelines, offenders with credible mitigatinfacts have emerged as clear winners: average sentence length has declined,'
while below-range sentences have tripled in frequency.1 9 Yet over the same
period, the rate of above-range sentencing has likewise tripled,2 0 meaning that
offenders with credible aggravating facts find themselves worse off, both at
sentencing and during plea negotiations that take place in its shadow.
Meanwhile, the Court has exacerbated that effect by stripping defendants with
aggravating facts of the procedural right to pre-hearing notice of a possible
above-range sentence.2 1 That result is ironic because the Sixth Amendment right
to jury fact finding at issue in Booker concerns only aggravating facts, not
mitigating facts. The Constitution, in other words, has nothing to do with the
most important consequences of Booker.
Second, contrary to the Court's insistence that advisory guidelines would
best vindicate Congress's intent, it has become clear in the last decade that the
Booker remedy marks a setback for Congress's key goals. The Sentencing
Reform Act was animated by concerns about unwarranted disparity in sentencing
decisions, especially inter-judge disparity and racial disparities. 2 2  Yet a
substantial body of empirical research confirms that inter-judge sentencing
disparity has increased under the advisory guidelines, with numerous studies
finding an increase in the "judge effect."23  At the same time, a number of
researchers have found that racial disparity in sentencing outcomes has increased
17. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's choice of
remedy "wonderfully ironic"); Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENVER U. L. REV.
665, 677 (2006) (remarking that a holding that judges exercised too much discretion "was
transmogrified, as if alchemically, into a holding that [sentencing judges] should have more
discretion"); Dianne E. Courselle, Slouching Toward Booker and Beyond: The Court Embraces and
Rejects the Role ofJuries at Sentencing, 37 McGEORGE L. REV. 513, 513 (2006) (calling this "[a]
great irony" of the Booker decision); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court: Sentencing Guidelines
Advisory, Not Mandatory, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005.
18. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Figure 3, notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
21. See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 716 (2008).
22. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 122-136 and accompanying text.
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since Booker.2 4  That conclusion is contested, but there is good reason for
concern that racial disparities have worsened under the advisory guidelines.
Those developments suggest that Booker's remedial opinion may have
accomplished the opposite of its stated objective.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I ("Booker's Background") briefly
summarizes the constitutional and remedial opinions in Booker, taking note of
some of the immediately obvious ironies of the remedial opinion. Readers
familiar with the decision and its aftermath should feel free to skip ahead. Part II
("Booker's Casualties") and Part III ("The Booker Backslide") set out the newly
apparent ironies described above. The Conclusion ("Booker's Bargain")
acknowledges that some commentators will find these ironies of the Booker
remedy untroubling in light of the decision's other consequences, but urges that
they be incorporated into critical assessments of the decision and its legacy.
I. BOOKER'S BACKGROUND
A. The Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines
Understanding Booker and its effects requires a brief survey of federal
sentencing practice under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. Throughout most of the twentieth century, criminal
sentencing in the federal system was "indeterminate," with judges and parole
boards exercising essentially unfettered discretion in choosing the form and
length of sentences within broad statutory ranges.2 5 In the 1970s and 1980s,
however, indeterminate sentencing came under fire from an unusual coalition of
progressive reformers and tough-on-crime conservatives. 2 6 Unchecked judicial
discretion, they argued, produced unwarranted disparities between similar
offenders who had committed similar offenses. The "first and foremost" goal of
sentencing reform was the reduction of such unwarranted disparity. 2 7
Two forms of unwarranted disparity were sources of particular concern.
First, Congress sought to reduce "inter-judge disparity," differences in sentencing
outcomes caused by the judge rather than by legitimate differences between
offenses and offenders. Troubled by research suggesting that judges presented
with identical case facts would impose widely divergent sentences, reformers
sought to promote consistency among judges in the same courtroom and
nationwide. Second, concerned that race discrimination played a subterranean
24. See infra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
25. Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 6-7 (2010).
26. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 227-28 (1993).
27. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United
States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 291, 295-96 (1993) ("Quite frankly, all
other considerations were secondary."). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012) (directing judges
at sentencing "to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct").
28. Scott, supra note 25, at 7 & n.25 (summarizing research).
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role in sentencing decisions, Congress sought to reduce racial disparities in
sentencing outcomes. 29 To accomplish those goals, the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 created the United States Sentencing Commission and charged it with
promulgating a set of sentencing guidelines that would bring "consisten[cy]" and
"fairness" to federal sentencing.
The operation of the Guidelines is lamentably complex, but a few key
features were essential to the Court's decision in Booker. For almost all felony
convictions, the Guidelines specify a fairly narrow sentencing range, expressed
as a number of months of imprisonment (such as 24-30 months).3 ' That
sentencing range depends on factual findings about the characteristics of the
offense and the offender. Both Congress and the Commission directed that
sentencing judges should make those findings, 3 2 consistent with judges'
longstanding freedom to determine and take into account any facts they deemed
relevant at sentencing.3 3
Once the guideline range was determined, however, the Guidelines (as
originally designed) left sentencing judges very little discretion. The Act
specified that the court "shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the,
range" established under the Guidelines, except in a few narrow and limited
circumstances. 3 4 Before imposing a sentence outside the guideline range, known
as a "departure," the Court was required to make further factual findings, 3 5 and
the sentence was subject to de novo review on appeal.36 For that reason, the pre-
Booker Guidelines were frequently described as "mandatory"; in all but rare
circumstances, judges were strictly bound by the upper and lower limits of the
guideline range.
29. Stith & Koh, supra note 26, at 227, 287 (noting that Senator Kennedy shepherded
sentencing reform through Congress based on his "clear conviction" that "judicial discretion
worked to the disadvantage of those already disadvantaged by birth and social condition").
30. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51-52 (1983).
31. The heart of the Guidelines is a sentencing table, or "grid." See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL 404 tbl. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015) [hereinafter 2015 GUIDELINES
MANUAL]. The rows of the table correspond to the offense level, while the columns correspond to
the criminal history category.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (directing "the court" to consider various factual issues and to
impose sentence); 2015 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 31, § IBl.1(a) (directing "the court" to
determine the guideline sentencing range).
33. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (excised by the Court in Booker); Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-35
(2005) (Stevens, J., majority opinion).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (authorizing departures only when "the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines"); 2015 GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 31, § 5K2.0 (listing specific factual circumstances in which departures may be
warranted).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (excised by the Court in Booker).
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B. Booker's Constitutional Holding
Twenty years later in Booker, a splintered Supreme Court partially
invalidated that structure. Two different 5-4 majority opinions were needed to
resolve the case, the first concluding that the Guidelines violated the
Constitution, and the second announcing a remedy for that violation.
In the constitutional opinion, the Court held that the mandatory guidelines
structure violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.37  The
constitutional defect related to the process for finding aggravating facts, and
respondent Freddie Booker's case provides a useful illustration. Based on the
evidence introduced at trial, Booker faced a guideline sentencing range of 210-
262 months of imprisonment.38 At sentencing, however, the judge made factual
findings about drug quantity and obstruction of justice that increased the
guideline range to 360 months to life imprisonment. The Court ultimately
imposed the guideline minimum sentence of 360 months. 3 9 That result violated
the Sixth Amendment, the Court held,4 0 under a rule first announced in Apprendi
v. New Jersey 41: any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the penalty
for a crime above the level authorized by the jury verdict or puilty plea "must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Despite its reputation, Booker's constitutional holding was fairly narrow.
The Sixth Amendment rule announced in Apprendi and applied in Booker is
asymmetrical, triggered only by factual findings that "increase" an offender's
sentence.4 3 It therefore applies only to aggravating facts, leaving judges free to
find by a preponderance of the evidence any mitigating facts that decrease an
offender's sentence.44  Indeed, at the time Booker was announced, the Sixth
Amendment rule was even narrower, triggered only when the sentence imposed
ultimately exceeded the maximum authorized by the jury verdict or guilty plea.4 5
As a result, most sentences imposed under the Guidelines raised no Sixth
37. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44 (Stevens, J., majority opinion).
38. Id. at 235.
39. Id. at 227.
40. Id. at 232-33.
41. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. See also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
42. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
43. Id.
44. Id. (holding that the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury determination of "any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum").
45. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., majority opinion); id. at
278 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[J]udicial fact finding to support an offense level determination or an
enhancement is only unconstitutional when that finding raises the sentence beyond the sentence
that could have lawfully been imposed by reference to facts found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant."). The Court has since corrected that peculiar feature of its Sixth Amendment cases.
See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158-63 (2013) (overruling prior precedent and
holding that any fact that increases the sentencing range, including a mandatory minimum, violates
the Sixth Amendment).
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Amendment concerns at all,4 6 and in the remainder of cases, judicial fact finding
was permissible for any mitigating circumstances.
Accordingly, in their arguments on the remedial issue, the parties in Booker
proposed fairly narrow changes to fix the constitutional problem. Both
respondents urged the Court to grant offenders a right to jury fact finding with
respect to any fact that would increase the sentence in a manner that violates the
Sixth Amendment.47 The United States advanced a similar proposal, urging that
the Court declare the Guidelines "inapplicable" to the small set of cases
involving judicial fact finding that violates the Constitution.4 8 Consistent with
those suggestions, four Justices voted to solve the constitutional problem by
granting offenders a right to jury fact finding at sentencing whenever-but only
whenever-the Sixth Amendment required it.4 9
C. Booker's Remedial Holding
In a surprise move, however, the Court rejected those options and instead
declared the Guidelines advisory in their entirety. In its remedial opinion, the
Court struck down two statutory provisions, one that made the guideline range
binding on sentencing )udges and another that governed the standard of review
for sentencing appeals. 0 The result, the Court explained, was that the Guidelines
would become "effectively advisory," and appellate courts would review
sentences for "reasonableness." 1 Neither the respondents, nor the government,
nor members of Congress, 52 nor any other amici curiae had suggested that course
53
of action.
46. Booker, 543 U.S. at 275-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 248 (Breyer, J., majority
opinion). Estimates differed as to the exact percentage of cases in which judicial fact finding under
the Guidelines resulted in a Sixth Amendment violation. One Sentencing Commission report, later
lodged with the Supreme Court, estimated said that up to 65% of cases involved unconstitutional
fact finding. Memorandum from Lou Reedt to Tim McGrath (July 20, 2004), at 3 [hereinafter
Reedt Memorandum]. But the report acknowledged that "it is likely that far fewer cases will
actually be affected" due to limitations in the data collected by the Commission. Id. at 3-5.
47. Booker, 543 U.S. at 267 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). Fanfan also urged, in the
alternative, that all judicial fact finding at sentencing be abolished and replaced by jury fact finding.
Id.
48. Id. at 265-66 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
49. Id. at 284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) ("I would simply allow the Government to ...
prove any fact that is required to increase a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt."); id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (agreeing with Justice
Stevens's proposed remedy, but on alternative grounds).
50. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-61 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (excising 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)
and § 3742(e)).
51. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-63 (2005) (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
52. See Brief for Senators, supra note 6, at *21-25 (discouraging the Court from adopting
different rules for fact finding that adjusts the offense level "down, but not up," but not suggesting a
system of advisory guidelines).
53. Justice Breyer first floated the possibility of advisory guidelines at oral argument, asking
then-Acting Solicitor General Paul Clement "what would be wrong with" altering Section
3553(b)(1) to make the Guidelines advisory in all cases. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 7, at *44.
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As all members of the Court recognized, advisory guidelines solved the
Sixth Amendment problem.54 But the Court's chosen remedy was remarkable in
its breadth, changing the sentencing process for every offender in every case. By
altering the underlying statutes "across the board," the Court went well beyond
the narrow class of offenders whose sentences actually violated the Sixth
Amendment. 5  That choice was no accident. The Court readily acknowledged
that its remedy exceeded the scope of the underlying constitutional violation,
curtly stating that it refused to select a remedy based on "simple numbers."5 6
Instead, the remedial majority anchored its decision in congressional intent,
concluding that jury fact finding of any kind was incompatible with the text,
history, and purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984." For several
reasons, the remedial majority explained, advisory guidelines would best
comport with Congress's "basic statutory goal" to "diminish[] sentencing
disparity."5 8 It would retain judges as the sole factfinders at sentencing, while
also preserving so-called "real offense" sentencing based on offenders' actual
conduct whether or not charged or proven at trial.59 In addition, the Court noted,
advisory guidelines would avoid the "asymmetry" of a system that made it "more
difficult to adjust sentences upward than to adjust them downward."60  In
separate dissents, Justices Stevens and Scalia each took strong exception to the
suggestion that Congress would have intended a system of advisory guidelines. 61
The remedial opinion in Booker left many questions unanswered, especially
about the scope of sentencing judges' discretion to sentence outside the guideline
range and the standard of appellate review of sentences for "reasonableness." It
took nearly two years for the Court to clarify in Gall v. United States that courts
of appeals should review sentences under a highly deferential "abuse of
discretion" standard.6 2 Appellate courts have taken that directive to heart. Since
Gall, courts of appeals rarely vacate sentences on substantive reasonableness
grounds.63
54. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (recognizing that "merely advisory provisions" setting a guideline
maximum would not implicate the Sixth Amendment); id. at 259 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
55. Id. at 263.
56. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
57. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246-49 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
58. Id. at 250 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
59. Id. at 296 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 257-58 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
61. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 292 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing
that "Congress has already considered and overwhelmingly rejected the system [the Court] enacts
today," expressing "both an unmistakable preference for the certainty of a binding regime and a
deep suspicion of judges' ability to reduce disparities in federal sentencing"); id. at 303 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part) ("No headline describing the Sentencing Reform Act ... would have read
'Congress reaffirms judge-based sentencing' rather than 'Congress prescribes standardized
sentences."').
62. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 105-06 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 BOOKER REPORT].
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II. BOOKER'S CASUALTIES
Eleven years of experience have only compounded the ironies of the Booker
remedial opinion. An evaluation of trends in federal sentencing since 2005
reveals that, on balance, offenders face less severe outcomes under the advisory
guidelines. Yet the decision has not benefited everyone. Ironically, the
offenders most harmed by Booker are the same offenders whose constitutional
rights had been violated under the mandatory guidelines.
A. Winners under the Advisory Guidelines
For offenders as a whole, sentencing outcomes have improved at least
modestly in the post-Booker system. As Figure 1 shows, the average length of
64
prison sentences in the federal system has fallen since 2005.
Figure 1: Average Sentence Length
FY 2003-2015
90
80-
S70-
O
2 60-
50-
<P 20-
10-
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Fiscal Year
64. Data for this and subsequent figures were derived from the Commission's annual
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for each fiscal year (FY). See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.13 (2015) [hereinafter 2014
SOURCEBOOK]. When calculating the average length of prison sentences, the Commission codes a
sentence of probation as zero months of imprisonment. Id. at tbl.13 n.I. Consistent with the
Commission's ordinary approach, FY 2004 excludes sentences imposed after June 24, 2004, when
the Supreme Court decided Blakely. Similarly, FY 2005 excludes sentences imposed before
January 12, 2005, when the Court decided Booker. Fiscal year 2015 is the most recent for which
final data are available. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2015 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (2016) [hereinafter 2015 SOURCEBOOK].
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Offenders received an average sentence of 50.1 months before the Booker
decision in 2004. Average sentence length continued to increase slightly in the
period of uncertainty that followed, reaching 51.8 months in 2006 and 2007. But
in the wake of Gall, it quickly reversed course and had fallen to 44.3 months by
2010. Since then, average sentence length has hovered around that level, with
average sentence length of 44.0 months in 2014 and 2015. The change is not as
revolutionary as many observers expected, and scholars have advanced a number
of theories to explain the relative durability of the advisory guidelines. 65 Yet the
difference is real: federal courts today impose sentences on average 11.8% lower
than before Booker.
It is hazardous, however, to attribute trends in average sentence length over
the last decade to Booker, given the enormous number and variety of other
factors that contribute to sentence severity. 66 To illustrate the problem, Figure 2
displays trends in average sentence length across the four largest categories of
federal criminal offenses: drug trafficking, immigration, fraud, and firearms.
Figure 2: Average Sentence Length, by Offense Type
FY 2003-2015
80-
~70-
0
3 0-
41 0-
10~-
2003 .2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Fiscal Year
Sentences for drug trafficking have decreased substantially in the last
decade, and Booker could be a driving force behind the change. Average
sentence length for drug trafficking offenses stood at 81.3 months in 2004 before
65. See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 901,
949-50 (2015) (arguing that judges continue to use the Guidelines as anchors when sentencing).
66. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 356 (2012).
Drug Trafficking
Fraud
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the decision and actually increased slightly to 83.2 months by 2007. After Gall
made clear the extent of judges' discretion under the advisory guidelines,
however, drug trafficking sentences plunged, reaching 70.0 months by 2011 and
sliding to 67.0 months by 2015.68 That marks a 17.6% decline in the length of
drug trafficking sentences, which now stand at their lowest levels since at least
1996.69 Survey data indicate that roughly one-third of federal district judges
consider the drug trafficking guidelines too severe,70 suggesting that Booker may
indeed have played a role in the trend.7 '
For two other categories of offenses, on the other hand, legal developments
unrelated to Booker make it almost impossible to disentangle the effects of the
decision. For immigration offenses, average sentence length has fallen from 23.9
months in 2004 to 15.0 months in 2015, a decline of more than one-third. 7 2 But
that change primarily reflects the Department of Justice's decisions over the last
decade to expand and formalize Early Disposition Programs, which offer
immigration offenders significant sentence reductions. 7 3 At the same time, the
volume of immigration cases surged in the decade following Booker, expanding
from 22.5% of convictions in 2004 to 31.5% of convictions in 2012.74 Because
immigration offenses carry average sentences less severe than other offenses,
overall average sentence length has declined as the immigration docket has
grown.75 Conversely, in fraud cases, average sentence length has steadily
67. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.13 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 13 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 SOURCEBOOK].
68. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.13 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK]; 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at
tbl. 13.
69. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.13 (1997). Prior to 1996, the Commission did not systematically report on drug trafficking
offenses in a manner that allows for straightforward comparisons.
70. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.8 (2010) (reporting that roughly one-third of district
judges consider the guideline range generally "too high" for drug trafficking offenses, and that the
figure is 70% for crack cocaine cases).
71. The most high-profile change to drug sentencing since Booker is the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), which narrowed the ratio between quantities of
crack and powder cocaine that trigger statutory and guideline punishment levels. But the Act
cannot explain much of the decline in average sentences for drug trafficking, both because the trend
was apparent before its enactment and because crack cocaine accounts for just 8.2% of new
sentences for drug trafficking offenses. See 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at fig.A.
72. 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.13; 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.13.
73. 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 63, at 59 (noting that amendments to the guidelines also
contributed to the decline in average sentence length in immigration cases). See also Memorandum
of James M. Cole to All United States Attorneys, Jan. 31, 2012, at 3-4 (setting out Department of
Justice policy on Early Disposition or "Fast-Track" Programs), available at http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fast-track-program.pdf.
74. See 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.13 (pre-Blakely data); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.13 (2013) [hereinafter 2012
SOURCEBOOK] (pre-Blakely data).
75. Bowman, supra note 66, at 366 & n.22. Growth in the immigration docket cannot,
however, fully explain the decline in average sentence length in the federal system. Even
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increased since Booker, from 16.0 months in 2004 to 27.0 months in 2015.76 The
Commission, however, attributes that trend not to Booker, but rather to
substantive amendments to the guidelines and changes in criminal behavior, such
77as an increase in loss amounts in fraud cases.
Those cross-cutting trends illustrate the difficulty in making general
pronouncements about Booker's effects in a system as large and complex as the
federal criminal justice system. Sentencing outcomes are shaped by a host of
factors unrelated to the advisory guidelines, including amendments to substantive
law, changes in patterns of criminal behavior, and shifting prosecutorial
priorities. That makes it difficult to isolate the effects of Booker.
Nonetheless, there is one category of offenders that is unambiguously better
off under the advisory guidelines: offenders with credible mitigating facts.
Under the mandatory Guidelines, except in rare cases, sentencing courts lacked
authority to enter any sentence below the guideline minimum." Booker
abolished that restriction, empowering judges to sentence below the guideline
range whenever they wish, subject only to a deferential "abuse of discretion"
- 79.
review.
In the 11 years since Booker, courts have exercised that power liberally, to
the benefit of offenders with plausible mitigating circumstances. As Figure 3
shows, the rate of below-range sentencing has increased dramatically.
Figure 3: Rate of Below-Range Sentencing
FY 2003-2015
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excluding immigration offenses, average sentence length has fallen from 68.0 months in 2004
before Booker, to 56.1 months in 2015. See supra Figure 2.
76. See 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.13; 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at
tbl.13.
77. 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 63, at 59.
78. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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On the eve of Booker, judges initiated a sentence below the guideline range
in just 5.2% of cases.80 That rate more than doubled in the immediate aftermath
of the decision, hovering at 12.0% or 13.0% until 2007. Since Gall, that trend
has accelerated, with the rate of judge-initiated, below-range sentencing reaching
21.3% in 2015, more than triple its pre-Booker levels.8 ' That trend mirrors the
increase in overall below-range sentencing since 2005, including below-range
sentences sponsored by the government. The rate of below-range sentencing
stood at 27.1% in 2004 but has climbed to 50.6% as of 2015.82 That is a major
milestone: most sentences in the federal system now fall below the guideline
range, compared with roughly one-quarter before Booker.
As noted above, for immigration and fraud offenses, it is difficult to
disentangle the effects of Booker from changes in chargin 3practices, substantive
law, and patterns of criminal behavior in the last ten years. Other offense types,
therefore, offer a cleaner picture of the effects of Booker with fewer interfering
variables. Figure 4 shows the rate of judge-initiated, below-range sentencing,
limited to drug trafficking and firearms offenses. 84
Figure 4: Rate of Below-Range Sentencing, by Offense Type
FY 2003-2015
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80. 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.27A.
81. 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at Ub.N.
82. Jd.
83. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
84. Data are derived from Table N in the Commission's annual Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics. See 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.N.
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For drug trafficking and firearms cases, the trends in below-range
sentencing since Booker are substantial and strikingly parallel. Both began with
low rates before Booker (4.4% and 6.0%), which spiked in the immediate
aftermath of the decision (13.0% and 14.6%) and continued to climb after Gall to
more than triple their pre-Booker levels by 2015 (22.5% and 20.0%).15
Some scholars have downplayed the significance of the trend, suggesting
that the number of below-range sentences may have increased, but the size of
departures below the range has decreased. 8 6 That claim has been disproved.
Both in absolute and relative terms, the extent of departures below the guideline
range remains just as large under Booker and Gall (21 months, or 40.7% below
the guideline minimum) as before the decisions (17 months, or 40.0% below the
* * *87guideline minimum).
The upshot is that offenders with credible mitigating facts have fared far
better under the advisory guidelines. The vast majority of judge-initiated, below-
range sentences imposed today would have been legally impermissible before
Booker. As a rough estimate, perhaps 13.9% of offenders who received a judge-
initiated, below-range sentence in 2015 would have received a guideline sentence
in 2004. That equates to around 10,000 offenders receiving lower sentences
each year.
B. Losers under the Advisory Guidelines
Not all offenders, however, have benefited from Booker. To the contrary,
another group of offenders is unambiguously worse off under the advisory
guidelines: offenders with credible aggravating facts. The change is evident not
only in sentencing outcomes, which have worsened, but also in changes that have
made the sentencing process more hazardous for offenders with plausible
aggravating circumstances.
1. Sentencing Outcomes
Just as rates of below-range sentencing have increased since Booker, rates
of above-range sentencing have increased as well. As shown in Figure 5, the rate
of above-range sentencing for offenders has more than tripled since 2005.
85. See 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.27A.
86. See Tokson, supra note 65, at 948 (citing the Commission's 2006 report on the effects of
Booker).
87. 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 63, at 92. Also outdated is the contention that "[flor
every year since Booker, the vast majority of sentences have continued to fall within the Guidelines
range." Tokson, supra note 65, at 948. In both 2014 and 2015, most sentences fell outside the
guideline range. See 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.N (reporting 46.0% of sentences
within the guideline range); 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.N (reporting 47.3% of
sentences within the guideline range).
88. Compare 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.N (reporting that only 2.2% of sentences
were non-government sponsored downward departures not based on Booker, leaving 19.1% based
at least in part on Booker), with 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.N (pre-Blakely data)
(reporting 5.2% of sentences were downward departures).
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Figure 5: Rate of Above-Range Sentencing
FY 2003-2015
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Before Booker, in 2004, judges imposed upward departures in a tiny
fraction of cases, less than 0.8%.89 After Booker, however, the percentage of
sentences above the guideline range doubled to 1.6%, and in the wake of Gall it
has continued to climb to 2.2%.90 The trend is even clearer for firearms and drug
trafficking offenses, where the effects of Booker should be most evident.91 For
firearms offenses, above-range sentencing stood at 1.3% before Booker, but
quickly doubled to 2.5% by 2007, before surging to 5.0% by 2015, triple its pre-
Booker levels. 92 For drug trafficking offenses, above-range sentences were
vanishingly rare before Booker, imposed in just 0.2% of cases. 93 But the rate
leapt to 0.7% by 2006 and has climbed to 1.4% of cases by 2015, an increase of
nearly 700% .9
Scholars and commentators have almost entirely ignored the increase in
above-range sentencing, despite extensive discussions of the increase in below-
89. 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tb.26.
90. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at
tbl.27 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 SOURCEBOOK] (post-Booker data); 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
64, at tb.N.
91. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
92. See 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.27 (pre-Blakely data); 2007 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 67, at tbl.27; 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.27.
93. 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.27 (pre-Blakely data).
94. See 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67, at tbl.27; 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at
tbl.27.
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range sentencing.9 5 Consider a few possible explanations-one practical, one
cynical, and one substantive-for that omission.
One possibility is practical: sentences above the guideline range have
tripled in frequency, but they remain rare. The rate of above-range sentencing
was very low before Booker (under 0.8%) and remains low today (just above
2.2%).96 That is not to say the number of above-range sentences is trivial. In
2015, more than 1,000 offenders received above-range sentences that would have
been impermissible before Booker,97 and because their above-range sentences are
especially long, they account for a disproportionate share of the federal prison
population. Still, below-range sentences outnumber above-range sentences by a
10-to-1 margin,9 and commentators naturally focus on trends that affect a larger
segment of offenders.
Another possibility is cynical: offenders with credible aggravating facts
tend to elicit little sympathy. Common grounds for an upward departure include
an extensive criminal history, additional uncharged criminal conduct, acts
causing serious injuries or death, and the like,9 9 and judges likely reserve above-
range sentences for offenders they consider the "worst of the worst." Unlike
offenders with credible cases for mitigation, who can count on support from
progressive scholars and reformers, offenders with serious aggravating facts have
few advocates.
A final possibility, however, is more substantive. Scholars may have
mistakenly assumed that judges universally consider the Guidelines too severe
and will therefore exercise their discretion under Booker entirely in one
direction. 00 In fact, judges' views of the Sentencing Guidelines have always
been divided, with a substantial contingent of judges expressing agreement with
the most controversial guidelines or even finding them too lenient.' 0' The fact
that above-range sentencing has tripled since Booker thus reveals an
underappreciated function of the mandatory guidelines. For an enormous
number of offenders, the mandatory guidelines forced judges to impose sentences
they considered too severe. Yet for a smaller group of offenders, the mandatory
guidelines forced judges to impose sentences they considered too lenient. The
Booker remedy empowered judges to follow their conscience as to both groups.
95. A few scholars have made brief reference to the uptick in above-range sentences. See
Tokson, supra note 65, at 948; Frank 0. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 Hous. L. REv. 1227, 1237-38 (2014).
96. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
97. See 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at th.N.
98. See id. (reporting 14,514 judge-initiated below-range sentences, compared with 1,506
above-range sentences).
99. See, e.g., 2015 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 31, § 5K2.1 (offenses resulting in death);
id. § 5K2.3 (causing extreme psychological injury); id. § 5K2.8 (extreme conduct "unusually
heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim").
100. See Scott, supra note 25, at 47-48 (noting the widespread belief that "everybody loves to
hate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines").
101. See id. at 48-50 (summarizing the results of Sentencing Commission surveys of district
judges).
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2. Sentencing Process
As sentencing outcomes have worsened, the sentencing process also has
become more challenging for offenders with credible aggravating facts. Because
above-range sentences have become more prevalent, the plea bargaining position
of those offenders has weakened. At the same time, the Court has extended the
logic of Booker to strip offenders with aggravating facts of a valuable notice
requirement.
First, Booker has weakened the plea bargaining position of offenders with
credible aggravating facts. Under the advisory guidelines, judges have greater
discretion to impose above-range sentences, and their sentences are almost never
reversed on appeal.1 0 2 As noted above, judges have not hesitated to exercise that
discretion, with the rate of above-range sentencing tripling since Booker.103 As a
result, defendants with credible aggravating circumstances face far greater risks
at sentencing-and everybody knows it, including prosecutors and defense
counsel.
That dynamic necessarily affects plea negotiations, which take place in the
shadow of the sentencing hearing. Defendants are risk-averse and
understandably anxious about a sentence above the guideline range.' 0 4 To obtain
the same results they would have secured under the mandatory Guidelines,
defendants must now make greater concessions to the prosecution. At the
margins, offenders with serious aggravating facts thus have less leverage to
secure the dismissal of charges, to engage in "fact bargaining" over the profile of
facts presented at sentencing, and to extract favorable sentence recommendations
from the government. Those effects are difficult to measure, since sentencing
data treat charges and facts as inputs rather than outputs. But in a system where
more than 97% of convictions result from a guilty plea rather than trial, 0 5 ripple
effects on the plea bargaining process are important.
Second, offenders with credible aggravating facts have been stripped of a
useful notice protection they enjoyed under the advisory guidelines. In 1991,
citing due process concerns, the Supreme Court held in Burns v. United States
that criminal defendants were entitled to prior notice of a possible upward
departure.1 0 6 Notice was essential, the Court reasoned, to enable defense counsel
to prepare effectively for the sentencing hearing, given that an upward departure
could rest on any number of factual grounds not adequately taken into account by
the Commission. The Court therefore announced a rule, later codified as Rule
32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that a criminal defendant is
102. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
103. See supra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
104. Wes R. Porter, The Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can Also Swing Toward
Predictability: A Renewed Role for Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 469, 470-71 (2011).
105. See 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at tbl.11 (reporting that 97.1% of federal sentences
resulted from guilty pleas in 2015).
106. Bums v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h).
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entitled to advance notice of any possible upward departure not identified in the
presentence report or a party's submissions.
After Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, however, the Court
repudiated that protection. In Irizarry v. United States, the Court held by a 5-4
margin that in light of the Booker remedial opinion, advance notice of a possible
above-range sentence was no longer required.107  It reasoned that Booker had
eliminated "[a]ny expectation subject to due process protection ... that a criminal
defendant would receive a sentence within the presumptively applicable
guideline range."'os The same feature of the Guidelines that triggered the Sixth
Amendment defect in Booker-the "expectation" of a sentence no higher than
the guideline range without further fact finding-also was the source of the
entitlement to notice recognized in Burns.1 09 Rendering the Guidelines advisory
in Booker had neatly solved both constitutional problems.
The Court also considered it unnecessary and inefficient for a sentencing
court to provide offenders with advance notice of the grounds for a possible
upward departure. Under the advisory guidelines, after all, there is no limit to the
number of reasons a judge might impose a sentence above the guideline range.1o
In essence, Booker itself puts everyone on notice of every possible sentence in
every case.
As a practical matter, however, advance notice of the specific grounds for
an above-range sentence is quite valuable to defense counsel. Indeed, the Court's
reasoning seems exactly backward in light of Burns. The fact that the grounds
for a possible above-range sentence have multiplied exponentially makes a notice
requirement more important, not less. Although only a small segment of
offenders would benefit from a broader notice requirement, the Court's
unwillingness to recognize one reinforces that Booker has made the sentencing
process more challenging for offenders with credible aggravating facts.
C. Booker's Deepening Irony
The starkly different results for offenders with aggravating and mitigating
circumstances reveal a deepening irony of the Booker remedy. At the time of the
decision, the primary criticism of the remedial opinion was that it went further
than necessary. In dissent, Justice Stevens blasted the majority for the
"extraordinary overbreadth" of its "unprecedented" remedy.11 Rendering the
Guidelines advisory in toto went too far, he argued, by conferring a windfall on
107. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713-15 (2008). Technically, Rule 32(h) continues
to apply to "departures," but not to post-Booker "variances." But because variances now
outnumber formal Guidelines departures, the effect of Irizarry is to all but eliminate the notice
requirement.
108. Id. at 713.
109. Burns, 501 U.S. at 135-39.
110. Id. at 144-47.
111. Booker, 543 U.S. at 274 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the majority of defendants who had not suffered any constitutional injury.1 1 2 On
that view, Booker might be compared to Miranda v. Arizona,1 13 another decision
criticized on the ground that its remedy-"prophylactic rules" about warnings for
the custodial interrogation of suspects-conferred a windfall on defendants who
had not necessarily suffered any constitutional violation.1 14
But Booker is even more peculiar because, by its terms, the remedy extends
a benefit only to offenders who had not suffered any constitutional violation. The
fact finding process for aggravating circumstances, after all, remains exactly the
same under the advisory guidelines: the sentencing judge must make all
determinations, and only by a preponderance of the evidence. The experience of
respondent Freddie Booker on remand offers a powerful illustration. Booker's
Sixth Amendment rights had been violated, and he demanded a jury trial
concerning the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible. The Court gave
him advisory guidelines instead. On resentencing, the judge was tasked with
making the same findings, based on the same evidence, under the same
evidentiar standards. To the surprise of no one, the judge entered the same.
sentence.
Eleven years of experience under the advisory guidelines reveal that the.
irony of the Booker remedy has grown deeper. Not only have offenders with
credible aggravating facts received no tangible benefit from the advisory
guidelines, but also their position has actually worsened. The class of offenders
whose constitutional rights were trampled under the advisory guidelines face
more severe sentencing outcomes and a more challenging sentencing process,
under a system designed by the Court for their benefit. Instead, the primary
beneficiaries of the new system are offenders with credible mitigating facts, who
find it easier to obtain a below-range sentence. That is a remarkable outcome,
considering that the Sixth Amendment violation in Booker was unrelated to
mitigating facts.1 16 More than a decade later, the most important consequences of
Booker have nothing to do with the Constitution.
112. Id. at 275-76, 278-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the testimony of the Commission
before congressional hearings on the implications of Blakely).
113. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. See, e.g., Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) ("It is an inherent attribute of
prophylactic constitutional rules, such as those established in Miranda and Pearce, that their
retrospective application will occasion windfall benefits for some defendants who have suffered no
constitutional deprivation."); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to
Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 174, 176-77 (1988) (criticizing the legitimacy of a
constitutional prophylactic "court-created rule[s] that can be violated without violating the
Constitution itself'). The Court blunted those criticisms in Dickerson v. United States by holding
that the rules announced in Miranda were in fact constitutionally compelled. 530 U.S. 428, 439-41
(2000).
115. United States v. Booker, 149 F. App'x 517, 518 (7th Cir. 2005).
116. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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III. THE BOOKER BACKSLIDE
In another ironic development, the Booker remedial opinion has coincided
with a setback for Congress's key objectives in the Sentencing Reform Act. A
growing body of empirical research has found post-Booker increases in inter-
judge disparity and racial disparity, two forms of unwarranted disparity Congress
sought to reduce through the Guidelines. Those developments are in tension with
the remedial opinion's contention that advisory guidelines would best vindicate
Congress's intent. 117
A. Inter-Judge Disparity
Among Congress's primary objectives in the Sentencing Reform Act was
the reduction of inter-judge disparity, differences in sentencing outcomes driven
not by characteristics of the offense or offender but by the identity of the
sentencing judge."i8  Troubled by research indicating that judges sometimes
reached widely disparate conclusions about identical case facts, Congress hoped
that the Sentencing Reform Act would promote consistency and minimize the
effects of individual judges' philosophy, personality, or biases.
On that score, the mandatory guidelines achieved some measure of success.
Two large-scale studies of federal sentences in the mid-1990s concluded that
inter-judge sentencing disparity had decreased, using a "natural experiment"
method that compared levels of disparity before and after the promulgation of the
Guidelines. Using data from district courts that use a random case distribution
system, one study found that the estimated expected difference between the
average sentences of any two judges in 1986-1987 was 16% to 18%, but under
the mandatory guidelines in 1988-1993, the difference had fallen to 8% to
13%.119 Another study focusing on cities where judges receive a random
distribution of cases found that the identity of the judge explained 1.24% of
variation in sentences in 1994-1995, compared with 2.32% in 1984-1985, a
reduction "almost by half under the guidelines."l2 0 Although the improvement
was modest, the authors concluded that "Congress successfully achieved [its]
goal" of reducing inter-judge disparity under the Guidelines. 12 1
According to a series of recent studies, however, inter-judge disparity has
increased in the years since Booker. My own study of sentencing in a single
district court offered a first look at the problem, again using a natural experiment
117. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
119. James Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 271, 290, 303 (1999).
120. Paul Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 287 (1999).
121. Anderson et al., supra note 119, at 303.
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method.1 22 It found that the percentage of variance in sentence length explained
by the identity of the judge had nearly doubled, from 3.1% before Booker in
2002-2004 to 6.1% after Gall and Kimbrough in 2007-2008.123 It also analyzed
the below-range sentences of individual judges before and after Booker, noting
that some followed a "free at last" pattern, while others followed a "business as
usual" or "return to form" pattern.12
Subsequent research has confirmed that finding on a nationwide scale. The
best study, by Crystal Yang, compiled an impressive dataset of sentences from
2000 to 2009 by linking sentencing records from the Sentencing Commission,
case records from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), and
judge data from the Federal Judicial Center.1 2 5  Testing for random case
assignment yielded a sample of more than 158,000 cases from 156 courthouses in
74 federal district courts. 26 Using an analysis of variance methodology, Yang
calculated the standard deviation of judge effects on sentence length, after
controlling for offense and offender characteristics, in four time periods before
and after Booker.' 27  She found that offenders randomly assigned to a one-
standard-deviation harsher judge received an average sentence 2.5 months longer
before Booker, but the difference jumped to 4.8 months immediately after Booker.
and grew to 5.9 months after Kimbrough and Gall.12 8  Similarly, offenders
randomly assigned to a one-standard-deviation more lenient judge were 4.1%
more likely to receive a judge-initiated below-range sentence in the period before
Booker but 6.9% more likely after Booker.12 9 The study also concluded that the
application of mandatory minimums may be a large contributor to inter-judge
disparity, finding larger "judge effects" in cases not subject to a mandatory
minimum after Booker.130
The Sentencing Commission's own research reinforces those findings.' 3 '
For each federal district, the Commission has analyzed the "spread" between the'
judges on the court with the highest and lowest levels of judge-initiated, below-
range sentencing. In two-thirds of districts, its analysis found, the spread was
smallest in the period before Booker and largest in the period following Gall,
indicating that "sentencing outcomes increasingly depend upon the judge to
whom the case is assigned." 32
122. Scott, supra note 25, at 24-25. The study focused on the District of Massachusetts because
at the time it was the only federal court in the nation to disclose key sentencing documents to the
public, allowing an analysis of individual judges' sentences.
123. Id. at 33-34 (finding as well that the trend was particularly evident in cases not subject to a
mandatory minimum).
124. Id. at 35-37.
125. Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1268, 1294-96 (2014).
126. Id. at 1299-1300.
127. Id. at 1304-05.
128. Id. at 1307 & tbl.1.
129. Id. at 1310-11 & tbl.3.
130. Id. at 1324-25 & tbl.9.
131. 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 63, at 98-104.
132. Id. at 104.
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Most recently, a team of researchers released a Bureau of Justice Statistics
("BJS") working paper addressing a range of disparity questions based on
sentencing data from 2005-2012.' Although the study relies entirely on post-
Booker data and does not purport to evaluate the effects of the decision, it covers
the period before and after Gall, when the Court clarified judges' sentencing
discretion is subject to deferential, abuse-of-discretion review. For virtually all
offenses, the BJS paper found a statistically significant trend toward higher
dispersion in sentencing outcomes in the eight years following Booker, meaning
that "similarly situated offenders convicted of similar crimes are increasingly
sentenced differently."' 3 5 That finding tends to reinforce the earlier research,
which frequently reported that increases in inter-judge disparity accelerated after
Gall.136
None of these studies conclusively proves a causal relationship between
Booker and a subsequent increase in inter-judge disparity. Yet collectively, they
offer something close to a consensus that increasing inter-judge disparity has
followed on the heels of the switch to advisory guidelines. That represents a
setback with respect to one of Congress's central goals.
B. Race Disparity
Disparity between offenders of different race, and in particular more severe
sentencing of African-American offenders, is another form of unwarranted
disparity targeted by the Sentencing Reform Act.1 3 7 Congress hoped that a set of
mandatory sentencing guidelines would eliminate conscious or unconscious bias
in the sentencing process by focusing judges' attention on a standard set of
legitimate offense and offender characteristics. The switch to advisory
guidelines in Booker, however, has prompted renewed concern about race
disparity in federal sentencing1 3 8
No consensus has emerged among scholars who have examined trends in
race disparity under the advisory guidelines. But four major studies by the
Sentencing Commission,139 Crystal Yang,140 Joshua Fischman and Max
133. See generally WILLIAM RHODES ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING DISPARITY: 2005-2012
(2015), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fsd0512.pdf.
134. Id. at 2 & n.1, 5-6.
135. Id. at 57-58.
136. See Scott, supra note 25, at 33-37; Yang, supra note 125, at 1307; 2012 BOOKER REPORT,
supra note 63, at 104.
137. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
138. See Ryan W. Scott, Race Disparity under Advisory Guidelines: Dueling Assessments and
Potential Responses, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 1129, 1129 (2011) (summarizing the earliest
empirical studies to grapple with trends in race disparity after Booker).
139. See generally 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 63.
140. Crystal Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal
Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (2015).
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Schanzenbach,141 and the team commissioned by the BJSl42 each have found that
race disparities have increased in the wake of Booker. The studies differ in their
methodological details and in their assessments of the relationship between
judicial discretion, prosecutorial behavior, and race disparity. But they broadly
agree that racial disparities have increased in the aftermath of Booker, especially
after the extent of judges' sentencing discretion became clear in Gall.
The Sentencing Commission's Booker Report includes results of a
multivariate regression analysis that compares the effects of race on sentence
length across time periods. The Commission concluded that, after controlling for
offense and offender characteristics including the guideline sentencing range,
sentences for black male offenders exceeded sentences for white male offenders
by 5.5% in the period before Booker, but the difference had grown to 15.2% in
the first years after Booker and to 19.5% in the years following Gall.14 3 Yang's
study likewise found an increase in race disparity after Booker, albeit a more
modest one. Again using regression models that control for various offense and
offender characteristics, the study found that, after Gall, black offenders received
sentences 1.9 months longer than those of white offenders, representing a 75%
increase in the size of the racial cap in sentence length.14 Fischman and
Schanzenbach reached a similar conclusion, finding post-Gall increases in race
disparity in sentence length, offense levels, and downward departure rates.' 4 5
The BJS study, which focused exclusively on changes in racial disparity after
Booker from 2005 to 2012, found that by the end of the period studied, black
male offenders received sentences that were significantly longer than white
males.1 46 Sentences have become more lenient for all offenders during the 2005-
2012 period, the researchers found, but race disparity has increased because
black offenders have not benefited from that lenience to the same extent as white
offenders.1 4 7
Although all four studies find evidence of increased in race disparity after
Booker, several of the authors caution that the problem may not be judicial
discretion, but prosecutorial charging decisions, and in particular the use of
mandatory minimum sentences. Noting that black offenders are more likely to
face mandatory minimums than white offenders, and that the gap widened after
Booker, Yang concludes that "prosecutorial charging is likely a substantial
contributor to recent increases in racial disparities." 48  Fischman and
Schanzenbach go further, finding that "most of the post-[Gall] increase in [race]
141. Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The Role ofJudicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 729 (2012).
142. See generally RHODES ET AL., supra note 133.
143. 2012 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 63, at 108.
144. Yang, supra note 140, at 92-93.
145. Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 141, at 750-53 & tbl.5. The study focused on
"more serious crime categories," and thus excluded all immigration and fraud cases. See id. at 741.
146. RHODES ET AL., supra note 133, at 41.
147. Id. at 40-41.
148. Yang, supra note 140, at 78.
Spring 2016] 717
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA WREVIEW
disparity ... is due to the increased relevance of statutory minimums under a
system of advisory Guidelines."l 49 They suggest that "judicial discretion does
not contribute to, and may in fact mitigate, racial disparities in Guidelines
sentencing," and urge policymakers to focus their attention on mandatory
minimums instead.15  Along the same lines, Paul Hofer has criticized the BJS
study for overstating the effects of udicial discretion while underestimating the
influence of mandatory minimums. In his view, Booker merely "revealed the
discriminatory effects of mandatory minimums and prosecutorial discretion that
had been there all along."' 52
Understanding the role that prosecutorial decisions and mandatory
minimums play in driving race discrimination is essential. It is misleading,
however, to frame judicial discretion and mandatory minimums as competing
explanations for the increase in race disparity that the studies have identified.
Prosecutors' charging decisions are not made in a vacuum, and any changes since
Booker may be responses to judicial discretion. 153  The shift to advisory
guidelines weakened prosecutors' control over sentencing outcomes, and it
should come as no surprise if they fight back using the tools they have available.
Indeed, some prosecutors have acknowledged that they select charges with
mandatory minimum sentences more frequently after Booker to prevent judges
from imposing sentences they consider too lenient. 154 It is entirely possible that
greater judicial discretion has prompted the changes in charging decisions that, in
turn, have increased race disparity. They can be mutually reinforcing, rather than
mutually exclusive, explanations.
To be sure, not all researchers agree that race disparity has increased since
Booker. Standing athwart the other studies is a competing analysis by Sonja
Starr and Marit Rehavi,i's finding, based on data through 2009, that unexplained
race disparity has not increased since Booker and may have even decreased.1 56
Their study is a tour-de-force attack on the kind of regression analysis performed
by other researchers, especially the Sentencing Commission, 5  and marks a
major step forward for the empirical investigation of sentencing disparities.
Nonetheless, it does not dispel concerns about changes in racial disparity under
149. Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 141, at 757.
150. Id. at 761.
151. Paul J. Hofer, Review of DOJ-Commissioned Report: Racial Disparity in Post-Booker
Sentencing, 28 FED. SENTENCING REP. 196, 198 (2016).
152. Id. at 199.
153. Yang, supra note 140, at 104-05 (noting that "prosecutors may strategically respond to
increased judicial discretion after Booker if they want to bind judges from departing downward").
154. Id.
155. Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 1 (2013).
156. Id. at 45-46.
157. In response to the study, the Commission's researchers defended their own approach, see
generally Glenn R. Schmitt et al., Why Judges Matter at Sentencing: A Reply to Starr and Rehavi,
123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 251 (2013), and Starr and Rehavi published a surreply, Sonja B. Starr & M.
Marit Rehavi, On Estimating Disparity and Inferring Causation: Sur-Reply to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission Staff 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 273 (2013).
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Booker. A detailed assessment is beyond the scope of this Article, but three key
methodological choices divide the Starr and Rehavi study from the others.
First, Starr and Rehavi criticize studies of sentence disparity that evaluate
the sentencing stage in isolation, without taking into account earlier sources of
disparity like prosecutorial actions (charging, bargaining, and other decisions). 8
They take a broader approach that supplements the Commission's sentencing
data with information from other agencies, including arrest files from the U.S.
Marshals Service and case files from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys. 159
Conceptually, incorporating the decisions of prosecutors into the analysis of race
disparity offers obvious advantages and better reflects theoretical work on
"hydraulic discretion" in sentencing. They deserve credit for assembling a
unique and impressive dataset. Previous studies, including my own, are indeed
hampered by the lack of data about earlier prosecutorial decisions. 160
Second, Starr and Rehavi criticize studies of race disparity that use the
guideline range, or closely related values like offense level and criminal history
score, as control variables in regression models.' 6 1 They correctly note that those
values are shaped by charging, bargaining, and judicial fact finding processes
that may themselves produce race disparities, which the studies fail to capture.' 62
The guideline range incorporates a wide range of factual findings, but only in a
blunt and indirect manner. Starr and Rehavi, therefore, exclude those variables,
measuring offense seriousness instead only by reference to the arrest offense and
charge severity, along with an indicator of a mandatory minimum.163
The superiority of that approach depends, however, on the richness of
factual information available at the arrest and charging stage. Starr and Rehavi
downplay the offense information that their dataset lacks, but the omissions
sound quite serious. Drug quantities, the amount of loss in fraud cases, and the
offender's role in group offenses are crucial measures of offense severity in the
largest categories of federal offenses.' 64 Failing to control for those variables
risks missing an important source of race disparity, and the calculated guideline
range-however clumsily and belatedly-takes them into account. The BJS
study also questioned Starr and Rehavi's reliance on U.S. Marshals Service
charge records, which the authors deemed too vague to serve as a basis for an
analysis of disparity. 65
Third, Starr and Rehavi fault other researchers for drawing a causal
inference about the effects of Booker based on a comparison of race disparity
across time periods.'66 They correctly observe that many other changes in the
complex federal criminal justice system may contribute to race disparity across a
158. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 155, at 16-18.
159. Id. at 24.
160. See Scott, supra note 25, at 42 (acknowledging this limitation).
161. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 155, at 16-17.
162. Id. at 17.
163. Id. at 24-25.
164. Id. at 32-33.
165. RHODES ET AL., supra note 133, at 10 n.8.
166. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 155, at 49-52.
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period of years, making it hazardous to attribute any trends to Booker.
Accordingly, they focus their attention on evidence of "immediate sharp
changes" within "a couple of months" after Booker.1 6 7 Their premise is that
Booker acted as a sudden shock to the sentencing system, and if judges were
inclined to use their discretion in ways that exacerbate race disparity, some
evidence of that behavior should have been immediately obvious.
That view, however, is unduly pessimistic. "Natural experiments" that
draw comparisons across time periods must be interpreted with caution, as there
is no control group of federal courts in which the Guidelines remained
mandatory. Clever researchers, however, can help to address those concerns by
anticipating and correcting for known sources of potential interference.
Moreover, an insistence upon an "immediate sharp change[]" in disparity is
particularly misguided when examining the effects of Booker, a decision that
initially left many questions about the extent of judges' discretion unanswered.169
For example, it was not until Gall-nearly three years after Booker-that the
Court finally sorted out the basic features of appellate review, and made clear
that sentencing judges enjoyed broad discretion. Starr and Rehavi's approach
risks missing effects of Booker that operated as a slow burn, rather than a sudden
shock.o7 0
Accordingly, there is at least reason for concern that race disparity, like
inter-judge disparity, has worsened in the wake of Booker. Because concerns
about unwarranted disparity were the driving force behind the Sentencing
Reform Act, it is ironic that the remedial opinion in Booker defended the switch
to advisory guidelines as a way to honor Congress's intent.
CONCLUSION: BOOKER'S BARGAIN
This Article has highlighted mounting ironies in Booker's choice of
remedy, explaining how the results produced by the system of advisory
guidelines are in tension with the remedial opinion's stated purposes. The Court
found a constitutional violation affecting offenders deprived of their right to jury
fact finding for potential aggravating facts. Yet that class of offenders is worse
off under the advisory guidelines, while the remedial opinion has benefited
offenders with strong cases in mitigation that had suffered no constitutional
violation. The Court defended its choice of remedy as a means of advancing
Congress's intent to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity. Yet by two key
measures, inter-judge disparity and race disparity, Booker appears to mark a
setback for that goal.
Both of those arguments, it must be acknowledged, are intrinsic criticisms
of the Booker remedy. No doubt most scholars and commentators evaluating
167. Id. at 52-53.
168. The Yang study, for example, uses data about the arrest offense-derived from the same
sources used by Starr and Rehavi-to test the robustness of comparisons across periods. See Yang,
supra note 140, at 97-98.
169. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
170. See Schmidt et al., supra note 157, at 269-70.
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Booker after 11 years under the advisory guidelines are more concerned with
extrinsic considerations. Have federal sentences grown more just and effective,
or less? How has institutional power shifted among judges, prosecutors,
defendants, and the Sentencing Commission? And are the changes desirable? Is
the system today more practical, efficient, and comprehensible? Or has it grown
even more cumbersome and complex? Answers to those questions, rather than
tensions in the opinion's internal logic, will inform most critical assessments of
the advisory guidelines.
Nonetheless, the ironies of the remedial opinion ought to affect Booker's
legacy. This will not be the last case in which a closely divided Court confronts
a difficult remedial question, uncertain of the consequences of its selection. At
the time Booker was decided, the Court rested its choice of remedies in large part
on judgments-perhaps misjudgments-about the implications for offenders and
for Congress's intended goals. Reconsidering Booker's bargain with the benefit
of hindsight may help sharpen the Court's discussion the next time.

